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Abstract 
Fertility differences in Europe are to a large extent due to parity progression after 
the first child. We therefore use data from the third round of the European Social 
Survey to investigate second-birth rates in 23 countries. Focusing on the role of 
education level and child care availability, we argue that child care provision is an 
important determinant of the opportunity cost of parity progression, particularly 
for highly educated women. We find that in countries where the highly educated 
have lower second birth rates than the less educated, total fertility tends to be low, 
and vice versa. In addition, the effect of the timing of the first child appears to be 
mediated by education level and child care availability: in countries where large 
proportions of young children attend formal child care, the more highly educated 
exhibit much higher second-birth rates, while child care availability does not 
affect parity progression for the less educated. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
In the transition to Europe’s current low fertility levels, two stages can be 
distinguished. During the first stage, starting in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century in most European countries, married couples limited their family sizes by 
stopping their childbearing careers at both a lower age and a smaller final family 
size. This first stage primarily implied a declining incidence of high-parity births 
and the growing prevalence of the two-child family. It was temporarily and partly 
halted, or even somewhat reversed in some countries, during the ‘baby boom’ era 
in the mid-twentieth century. The timing of fertility shifted towards childbearing 
at younger ages during this halt. In the second stage, people started to postpone 
their first child (Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999). In northern, western, and 
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southern European countries, this stage of postponement started in the 1970s or 
early 1980s. In central and eastern Europe (CEE), it started only in the early 
1990s in most countries, after the fall of communism (Sobotka 2004). In recent 
decades, postponement has been compensated by recuperation at higher ages, 
resulting in some recovery of period fertility (Goldstein et al. 2009). The catching 
up is nevertheless incomplete so that many second- and higher-order births are 
foregone altogether. As a result, fertility remains well below the replacement level 
(Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Sobotka 2008). 
Although the level of childlessness has been gradually increasing during the 
past decades in many countries (Sobotka 2004, Chapter 5), a drop in cohort first-
birth probabilities is not the major driving force behind the emergence of very low 
fertility in Europe (Billari and Kohler 2004). Cross-country fertility differences 
today are to a large extent due to differences in second-birth rates, and to a much 
lesser extent to an increasing rejection of parenthood. Apparently, the biological, 
psychological and social incentives remain strong enough for most people to want 
at least one child (Kohler et al. 2006; Morgan and Taylor 2006). The gap between 
lowest-low and ordinary low fertility crucially depends on parity progression after 
the first birth: second-birth rates are typically low in the very low fertility 
countries of southern as well as central and eastern Europe. A notable exception is 
Germany, where low fertility is clearly linked with high childlessness rather than 
with very low parity progression after the first birth (Sobotka 2008: 39).  
There are signs that second births may become even more critical for 
European fertility levels in the future. Among people who do want to experience 
parenthood, the two-child norm seems to have weakened somewhat in recent 
decades (Goldstein et al. 2003; Breton and Prioux 2005). In most countries of the 
former EU-12, the proportion of young women preferring just one child doubled 
during the 1980s (Coleman 1996). In Austria, mean ideal family sizes have 
already reached the below-replacement level among recent generations of young 
adult women aged 25-39 (Testa 2007). According to the ‘low fertility trap 
hypothesis’, persistently low fertility levels may lead to declining fertility 
intentions and ideals if new generations of Europeans, brought up in a low-
fertility context, adopt and intensify the childbearing strategies of their parents 
and peers (Goldstein et al. 2003; Lutz et al. 2005). This intergenerational 
socialisation effect may already be observable in German-speaking countries 
(Testa and Grilli 2006). Low mean personal ideal family sizes have also been 
reported in southern European countries such as Italy and Spain (Testa 2007).  
This paper addresses differences between second-birth rates in 23 European 
countries and examines several questions. First, how large are the differences 
between second-birth rates in Europe? To what extent are second-birth rates 
affected by the postponement of first births? Some postponement effect is to be 
expected in all cases in the sense that the postponement of parenthood is bound to 
spill over to some extent to the quantum of fertility, starting with parity 
progression to the second birth (Billari and Borgoni 2005). How do such Jan Van Bavel and Joanna Różańska-Putek   109 
 
 
postponement effects on second-birth rates vary by social group and country? 
More specifically, this paper will examine social differences according to 
women’s educational levels  and study differences between countries, by focusing 
on the role of child care enrolment rates. We will also look at micro-macro 
interactions: how does the micro-level effect of education on the second-birth rate 
depend on macro-level enrolment rates in formal child care? 
 
 
2  Micro- and macro-influences on second-birth rates 
Differences in the extent to which there is any catching up on delayed births at a 
later age or not (i.e. the quantum implications of tempo shifts) are likely to be an 
important factor behind the divergence of fertility levels in Europe. Catching up, 
in turn, is expected to be influenced by the level of education at the micro-level, 
and by formal child care availability at the macro-level. 
 
2.1  The role of education 
According to Kohler et al. (2006), the postponement of first births is associated 
with increasing investments in human capital, particularly by women, implying a 
higher wage-earning potential. Women who postpone motherhood are often those 
with more work experience and higher wages prior to their first births. This 
postponement-induced increase in women’s actual and potential wages translates 
into higher opportunity costs, not only of first but also of second children. Given 
that the incentives to have at least one child still appear to be very strong, the 
higher child-costs associated with delaying the first child are likely to translate 
particularly as lower parity progression rates after the first birth.  
This hypothesis begs to be investigated systematically and thoroughly. We 
need to find out how it can be reconciled with the observation, made for a number 
of countries, that more highly educated women tend to exhibit a weaker negative 
postponement effect on second-birth rates and shorter birth spacing than less 
educated women (Köppen 2006; Neels 2006), while we know that the wage-
earning potential of the former group is higher. More generally, it has been found 
for several countries that more highly educated women, once they leave school 
and university, have higher birth rates than their less educated peers. This extends 
to second-birth rates (Hoem and Hoem 1989; Kreyenfeld 2002; Oláh 2003; 
Köppen 2006; Neels 2006; Lappegård and Rønsen 2005; Gerster et al. 2007; 
Klesment and Puur 2009). There is consequently some evidence of highly 
educated women catching up more after postponement. Nonetheless, other studies 
do not confirm such results or effects (e.g. Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Kantorova 
2004; Gerster et al. 2007). For Denmark, although the education level was 
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this was due to any faster catching up by highly educated women after timing 
their first birth later (Gerster et al. 2007).  
There are several reasons for expecting highly educated women to catch up 
faster after postponement. First, all else being equal, a higher earning potential 
facilitates a bigger family thanks to an income effect. Second, highly educated 
women may be motivated to concentrate their births in a shorter period of time in 
order to resume their professional career sooner after attaining their desired 
family size (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Köppen 2006). Third, a higher wage-
earning potential need not translate directly as higher opportunity costs. More 
highly educated women tend to have more resources and skills to reconcile paid 
work with raising more than one child. The double burden for mothers who 
pursue a professional career can be diminished in at least two ways. On the one 
hand, their partners can contribute more to household chores and child care (Oláh 
2003; Torr and Short 2004) while on the other, the availability of formal child 
care may facilitate investing in their professional career, especially in the context 
of dual-earner families, a most common pattern among women with higher 
education degrees (Van Dijk and Siegers 1996; De Henau et al. 2007; Lappegård 
2010). Finally, the relative cost of non-family care may be lower for them than for 
less educated women (Ermisch 1989; Kravdal 2007).  
 
2.2  Child care and the combination of paid work and family 
life 
The compatibility of professional work and family life may be at the heart of the 
differential effects of tempo shifts on the quantum of fertility, not just at the micro 
level within particular populations but also at the cross-country level in Europe. 
The differences between countries with high versus low compatibility of paid 
work and parenting may have important implications for the effects of delayed 
first births on second-birth rates. These effects are expected to be particularly 
strong in the context of inflexible labour markets and insufficient availability of 
child care facilities (Kohler et al. 2006). In contrast, if child care is more 
abundantly available and it is culturally acceptable to use it even with very young 
children, the opportunity costs of parity progression will go down (Rindfuss et al. 
2007). This would hold true in particular for the highly educated, given that they 
have the highest earning potential and, hence, the highest opportunity costs if 
parity progression cannot be combined with continued activity in the labour 
market (Kravdal 2007; Haan and Wrohlich 2009). 
A range of policy measures may facilitate or hinder the reconciliation of work 
and family life. In this paper, we focus on formal child care only. The use of 
formal child care depends on four major factors: its affordability, its availability, 
the quality of care and its social acceptance (Van Dijk and Siegers 1996; Brewster 
and Rindfuss 2000; Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000; Viitanen 2005; Rindfuss et al. 
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diverse child care enrolment rates. For example, in Germany and Italy, the 
number of day nurseries and nursery schools is very limited and opening hours 
usually do not fit the schedule of working parents (Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000; 
Del Boca 2002). In contrast, in the United Kingdom even if services are available 
and new places may be produced easily (as their number is to a larger extent 
subject to the free-market principle of supply and demand), the cost of formal 
child care is high making it unaffordable for many (Viitanen 2005). Additionally, 
cultural beliefs may discourage parents from sending their children to public child 
care institutions and therefore the use of non-formal care may be very 
important—as it is e.g. in southern Europe (Baizán 2009; Del Boca 2002). In 
central and eastern Europe such resistance may be combined with the shortage of 
child care services evoked after the collapse of the previous political and 
economical system as well as with the low trust in the quality of public child care 
(Szelewa and Polakowski 2008; Robila 2009; Hašková 2010). 
In fact, all over Europe, parents considering family enlargement may be more 
aware than childless persons of the difficulties and constraints that emerge from 
the double burden of a professional activity and family obligations—with, mostly 
for the women, a second shift awaiting them at home, once they have finished 
their paid work day (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Dribe and Stanfors 2009). 
Their further childbearing may also be influenced by their knowledge of the local 
child care situation. If their experience is negative, they may find it too risky to 
decide on having another child. This may help explain differences in second-birth 
rates across Europe.  
On the one hand there are countries with relatively high fertility. These are 
mostly in the Nordic region and in western Europe. France, for example, is well-
known as a country with generous family policies, part of it particularly targeting 
the promotion of third-order births (Ekert-Jaffé et al. 2002; Breton and Prioux 
2005), and potentially stimulating second births as well. In the Netherlands part-
time work schemes typically allow mothers to bring up children while still 
remaining in the labour market (Mills et al. 2008). In the Nordic countries too, 
some 40-50% of mothers of pre-school children combine part-time jobs with 
childrearing (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). This is facilitated by the availability 
of formal child care services. In France and the Netherlands, the provision of day 
care for children under 3 years of age is quite high, with a level close to the target 
of 33% set by the European Council at the Barcelona Summit in 2002 (OECD 
2008; European Commission 2008). In Scandinavian countries enrolment rates 
into day nurseries and nursery schools are among the highest in Europe (Hoem 
2005; OECD 2008). In Sweden almost 80% of pre-school children attended 
formal child care units in 2000 (Dribe and Stanfors 2009).  
In contrast, the use of formal child care is typically low in the low-fertility 
countries of southern and central and eastern Europe as well as in German-
speaking countries (e.g. Del Boca 2002; Rostgaard 2004; De Henau et al. 2007; 
Kotowska and Matysiak 2008; Baizán 2009). This may be due to the low 112   Second birth rates across Europe 
provision of such services, or, as mentioned earlier, to more cultural constraints 
such as attitudes towards childrearing. It is most likely that both components play 
a role here, with a mutually reinforcing effect.  
As to post-communist countries, parents there encounter many obstacles to 
combining childbearing and childrearing with a professional career. First of all, a 
lot has changed in terms of family policy and state interference in CEE during 
recent decades, after democratisation and economic and social reforms (e.g. 
Sobotka 2002; Neyer 2006; Kotowska and Matysiak 2008; Szelewa and 
Polakowski 2008). Under state socialism, job positions as well as free places in 
day nurseries and nursery schools were guaranteed or easily available (Rostgaard 
2004; Robila 2009). At the same time, career opportunities were limited, but low- 
or mid-income positions were obtainable without effort thanks to a doctrine of 
full employment. Nowadays, the labour market is more demanding and child care 
is less accessible. Second, attitudes towards work have changed: there are more 
opportunities to pursue a professional career and there are more people willing to 
do so. Third, both men and women are more likely to stay longer in education, 
and the number of female university graduates has boomed in particular. Finally, 
the economic situation is not stable and uncertainty is a trait of many spheres of 
life (Philipov 2002). As result, having a larger family is a bigger challenge than it 
used to be (e.g. Kotowska et al. 2008; Spéder and Kamarás 2008). 
In Germany the work-family conflict is also a salient and complex issue. 
While unemployment has been high in eastern Germany, in western Germany the 
belief is widespread that mothers themselves should be the (full-time) care-givers 
of very young children; child care provision is limited and inadequate, with hardly 
any private child care institutions (Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000; De Henau et al. 
2007). This leads to polarisation into two groups of women: a work-oriented 
group and those who devote themselves to childbearing and home-making 
(Köppen 2006). Concerning higher-order births, some authors claim that finding 
the appropriate care for children and maintaining their paid jobs is nearly 
impossible for western German women (Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000).  
In general, previous research confirms the role of child care availability and 
affordability in facilitating female labour force participation rates (Gustafsson and 
Stafford 1991; Van Dijk and Siegers 1996; Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000; De Henau 
et al. 2007; Rindfuss et al. 2007). However this effect is not consistent throughout 
Europe (see e.g. Gauthier 2007 for an overview). The availability of child care 
usually seems to matter more than its cost. In western Germany, for example, 
formal child care is hardly available anyway, so its cost cannot play a significant 
role. Availability is the crucial issue there. In contrast, in the market setting of the 
United Kingdom the cost of child care is found to influence its use (and female 
labour force participation), although there is evidence of unmet demand as well. 
The results of a simulation exercise from the same study suggest that a substantial 
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heavy subsidies for public day care institutions (Viitanen 2005). This supports the 
view that attitudes about child care use play an important role as well. 
The availability, and the use, of child care facilitate the reconciliation of work 
and family. Most studies focus on the impact of formal child care on female 
employment but some investigate directly its influence on fertility rates. A 
positive relationship between child care coverage was found for Spain for all 
births—i.e. first births as well as higher-order ones (Baizán 2009). For Sweden 
such results could not be detected (Andersson et al. 2004). The examination of 
child care characteristics (provision rate, child-to-staff-ratio and costs of care to 
parents) led to the observation that a good coverage of child care and efficient 
family policies in Sweden may enable parents to have the desired offspring no 
matter where they live. Also for western Germany there is no clear evidence that 
the regional availability of day-care slots affects childbearing decisions or 
mothers’ employment (Hank and Kreyenfeld 2003). However, in contrast to the 
Swedish case, it was argued that this may be due to the total lack of any feasible 
child care system in Germany. For Italy, representing yet another socio-cultural 
setting, there is evidence that child care availability has a positive impact on both 
female labour force participation and fertility (Del Boca 2002). 
Based on these earlier research findings, we expect that the transition to the 
second birth is made more easily in countries with adequate child care provisions 
and regulations aimed at diminishing the double burden of females. This is likely 
to be the case, very broadly speaking for the time being, in north-western Europe 
(Oláh 1998; 2003; Del Boca 2002; Köppen 2006; Brodmann et al. 2007). By 
contrast, we think that second-birth rates will be the lowest in countries where 
such provisions are poorly developed, like in southern and post-communist 
central and eastern European countries. 
 
 
3  Questions and hypotheses 
Summing up, we will address the following research questions and hypotheses. 
First, how large are differences between second-birth rates in Europe and how are 
they distributed geographically across Europe? From earlier research with register 
data we expect second-birth rates to be lowest in southern, central, and eastern 
Europe (including the Balkans, and with the exception of Germany, see Sobotka 
2008: 39), and highest in western and northern Europe.  
Second, how large are the effects of first-birth timing on second-birth rates 
and how do they vary by country? We expect that differential postponement 
effects between countries can be explained, at least to some extent, by the 
differential composition of European countries in terms of women’s education 
levels and by the extent of child care enrolment. This relates and leads to the third 
and fourth research question.  114   Second birth rates across Europe 
Third, how large is the effect of women’s education level on second-birth 
rates and how does this vary by country? In general across countries, we expect 
that highly educated women make the transition to second births faster than less 
educated women. More specifically, we expect that highly educated women tend 
to catch up faster than less educated women after the postponement of 
parenthood. In other words, our hypothesis runs that there is an interaction 
between the age at first birth and the education level: the negative effect of a high 
age at first birth on the second-birth rate is expected to be weaker for women with 
a high education level. Conversely, the postponement effect is expected to be 
stronger for women with a low education level. 
Fourth, how large is the effect of a country’s enrolment rate in formal day 
care services and how does this vary by education level? We expect that 
countries with higher enrolment rates tend to exhibit higher second-birth rates. 
In addition, we expect that formal child care enrolment particularly stimulates 
second-birth rates among the highly educated, since these are the ones that have 
the highest earning potential and are therefore faced with the highest 
opportunity costs if there is reduced availability of child care services. In other 
words, our final hypothesis is that there is a cross-level interaction effect 
between the individual education levels on the one hand and the country-level 
child care enrolment rate on the other hand. 
 
 
4  Data 
In our analysis we use data from the third round of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), edition 3.2, released in October 2008. Fieldwork was carried out using 
face-to-face interviews between late June 2006 and November 2007. The ESS is a 
biennial, cross-national, academically driven and partly repetitive survey that 
allows exploring behaviour and attitudes of Europeans. The third round of the 
ESS was conducted in twenty-five countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom (ESS Round 3, 
2006 and 2008). 
 
4.1  Selection of cases 
We excluded Russia and Ukraine from the analysis because we think that the 
cultural, institutional, historical, political and demographic differences to the rest 
of the European continent are too big to allow useful comparison here. As a 
result, our study covers the remaining 23 countries. This holds for most of the 
analyses but not for the final regression model that includes national measures for 
enrolment in child care (see below). For that model, we had to limit the number of Jan Van Bavel and Joanna Różańska-Putek   115 
 
 
countries to 16 since we lacked the comparable information on day care 
enrolment rates for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia and 
Switzerland. 
ESS3 respondents are selected based on four criteria: age, marital status, 
number of children and living with a partner. We include only those respondents 
who already had given birth to or fathered at least one child, never experienced a 
divorce and were living with a partner at the time of the interview. This selection 
was made in order to strike a balance between achieving reasonable homogeneity 
on the one hand and retaining a sufficient number of cases on the other. Divorcees 
were excluded because a divorce interrupts the process described in the 
theoretical section and in the hypotheses formulated above. Also, the number of 
stepchildren will be relatively high if we include the divorced. The role of divorce 
in second-birth rates merits a separate analysis and is not the focus of this paper. 
At the same time, we did not want to limit the analysis to married people even if a 
similar argument could be made about the never married and (possibly) separated. 
Limiting the analysis to married couples would have implied that we retained a 
very small and selective sample in a number of countries. 
ESS3 provides information on respondents’ partners as well, and we restricted 
the age- and cohort range by selecting only couples when both his and her age 
was between 15 and 45 years (both age limits included). Including older people 
would have extended the analysis to older cohorts, who had given birth in time 
periods not covered by the theoretical rationale for this paper, i.e. before the 
1980s. By applying these selection criteria, and after dropping cases with missing 
values for crucial variables, we achieved a sample size of 6177 couples. 
 
4.2 Variables  used 
Table 1 gives basic descriptive statistics for the variables that will be used in the 
analysis. The following paragraphs discuss the construction of the variables about 
education and enrolment in child care. 
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Table 1: 
Descriptive statistics of variables used in the models; never divorced couples with at 
least one child, both partners aged 15 to 45 years 
  Mean St. 
dev.
Min Max  N  % 
Analysis without child care enrolment (models I-IV)      
Having at least two children (dependent variable)           
- No          2159  34.9 
- Yes          4027  65.1 
Individual level characteristics of women          
Current age of woman  34.45  5.67  15  45  6186   
Age at first birth  25.65  4.63  14  44  6177   
Year first child was born  1997  5.9  1960  2007  6185   
Level of education              
- Low          1462  23.8 
- Medium          2879  46.9 
- High          1800  29.3 
Analysis with child care enrolment (model V)          
Having at least two children (dependent variable)           
- No          1563  34.0 
- Yes          3042  66.0 
Individual-level characteristics of women          
Current age of woman  34.68  5.57  5  45  4605   
Age at first birth  26.22  4.56  15  44  4601   
Year first child was born  1998  5.8  1979  2007  4604   
Level of education              
- Low        1191  26.0 
- Medium        1903  41.7 
- High        1473  32.3 
Characteristics of child care (country-level variable)         
Enrolment in day care below age 3  
in %, ca. 2004 
23.22  14.8  2  61.7  16   
Source: European Social Survey Round 3 Data 2006 - 2007 Jan Van Bavel and Joanna Różańska-Putek   117 
 
4.1.1 Education 
ESS3 records the highest educational degree obtained by respondents and 
distinguishes between 7 levels: (0) not completed primary education, (1) primary 
or first stage of basic, (2) lower secondary or second stage of basic, (3) upper 
secondary, (4) post secondary, non-tertiary, (5) first stage of tertiary and (6) 
second stage of tertiary. The same information was asked for respondents’ 
partners. Based on the information about him and her, we constructed dummies 
for three broad educational levels: low (categories 0-2 of the original ESS 
classification), medium (categories 3-4) and high (categories 5-6).  
4.1.2 Child care enrolment 
We used the OECD Family Database for information on child care enrolment 
rates across Europe. More specifically, we selected the extent of enrolment of 
children aged 0-2 in day care. This is the percentage of 0-2 olds in formal day 
care facilities. These services include day nurseries and other child care centres 
for the very young, care provided by registered childminders looking after one or 
more children at their own places, and by non-family members at the child’s 
home (OECD 2008). For most countries, the figures refer to the year 2004 (see 
below for the exceptions). 
We chose this indicator because, in contrast to indices based on the 
percentage of GDP spent on family services or policies, it is not directly 
influenced by the number of young children, and hence, by the second-birth rate 
that we will be modelling as a dependent variable. As this measure is relative to 
the number of children in a country, we believe that it offers a reasonable, though 
crude, assessment of formal child care practice in that country. ‘Reasonable’ but 
not ‘ideal’: the variable that we would ideally want to include in the analysis, i.e. 
some measure of child care availability (how difficult it is for a couple to find day 
care if they want and need it), is not available in a cross-nationally comparative 
way. To some extent, enrolment rates will be driven by demand factors: if a large 
proportion of couples want to bring their young children to day nurseries, 
enrolment rates will be higher, all else being equal. At another level, public policy 
will influence enrolment rates as well: if many couples want to bring their young 
children to day nurseries but policy does not stimulate formal child care 
provisions, enrolment rates will be lower than in countries where formal day care 
facilities are subsidised by the government. 
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Still, there are a number of concerns about these data. First, OECD collects 
the data reported in its international database from various sources. The quality of 
the enrolment data obviously depends on the collection method. Especially if 
small or medium-sized household surveys are used, sampling bias may arise 
(OECD 2008). Second, the year of reference is 2004, but there are several 
exceptions (Ireland: 2000; Germany, Poland: 2001; France: 2002; Finland, 
Norway, Slovakia: 2003; and Denmark: 2005). Third, as mentioned before, no 
data were available for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia and 
Switzerland which leads to the exclusion of these countries from our last model. 
Fourth, the OECD figures we used do not take into account the weekly amount of 
time children spend in day care. Also, some children may be counted double 
when they are enrolled in more than one part-time programme. For example, in 
some countries nursery schools are open only for half a day. It is therefore 
possible that a child attends nursery school in the morning and then family day 
care in the afternoon. These categories are commonly reported together and so the 
same child could be counted twice. This leads to an over-estimated participation 
rate. Fifth, enrolment rates are country-level averages. In some countries, 
enrolment in day care differs substantially by region, both for cultural and 
institutional (policy-related) reasons. This is the case, for example, in Belgium 
and Germany. This undermines the meaning and statistical power of the country 
level average. 
Finally, maybe the most important limitation is that most births analysed in 
this paper occurred years before 2004. Enrolment rates are bound to have changed 
between the years when the analysed couples were having their children. As a 
working assumption, we assume that the rank order of countries will not have 
changed a lot and that the differences between countries observed around 2004 
are a reasonable proxy for the actual enrolment rates around the time of the births 
we are analysing. 
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Figure 1:  
Enrolment in day care for children under 3  
 
Source: OECD 2008 
 
Overall, there is a clear pattern in day care use across Europe. First, as can be 
seen in Figure 1, differences in child care service use are large. While the average 
rate is 23%, there is a large variety in percentages of 0-2 years-old children 
enrolled in formal child care across Europe. High enrolment rates are observed in 
Nordic countries and in Belgium. These are countries with well-established child 
care policies, often assessed as generous welfare regimes. Low rates are reported 
in countries from central and eastern Europe: Poland (showing the lowest rate 
with 2%), Hungary, Germany and Austria (see Figure 1). As mentioned before, 
we expect this to reflect interplay between cultural, social and economic 




5  Method 
Since we only know children’s year of birth (not day or month), second-birth 
rates are analysed with discrete-time event history regression models. More 
specifically, we model the yearly probability of progression to the second birth for 
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where 
-  hij(t) is the discrete time hazard rate of having a second birth in year t for 
couple i in country j; 
-  t is the number of years elapsed since the birth of the first child (with t=0 
being the year of birth of the first child); 
-  Xij is a vector of individual characteristics that are modelled to only have 
fixed effects; 
-  Zij  is a vector of individual characteristics that are modelled to have 
effects that vary by country j; 
-  Cj is a vector with country characteristics. 
(All other parameters have the conventional meaning in random effects 
multilevel modelling). As can be seen from the equation, we assume that the 
hazard rate is a second-order polynomial function of the number of years since the 
first birth, allowing it to first go up, reach a maximum, and then go down. All 
models to be presented include a random intercept (β0j) to explicitly allow 
countries to have different second-birth rates. In the more complex models, the 
effects β4j of some individual-level characteristics are allowed to vary by country. 
While fitting the models, we applied the ESS design weights in order to 
account for differences between countries in sampling design. We did not apply 
population weights because our aim is not to estimate an average European effect 
(which would be dominated by the big countries due to their larger population 
size) but rather to look at differences between countries. 
It should be noted that, from a counterfactual perspective, the regression 
parameters obviously cannot be interpreted as estimates of a ‘pure’ causal effect 
on the second-birth rate (Engelhardt et al. 2009). Indeed, the explanatory 
variables can easily be argued to be endogenous. For example, if many women in 
a given country want to have a second child while wanting to continue working 
for pay, they might put pressure on their politicians to invest in making formal 
child care widely available. The positive association between child care 
availability and second-birth rates would then be caused by the so-called 
‘exogenous’ preference structure of these women. Therefore, our use of multilevel 
regression modelling has more modest aims here, i.e. to describe how a set of 
variables is associated with second-birth rates after controlling for the other ones 
(see Angrist and Pischke 2009 for a lucid discussion of different uses of 
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Also, when interpreting the effects of age at first birth and education, it should 
be kept in mind that only people who have given birth to at least one child are 
selected to be part of the analysis. As a result, the estimated effects on second-
birth rates will to some extent reflect selection effects. For example, highly 
educated women who are strongly family-oriented and have their first child at a 
relatively early age will be more likely to be included in the analysis than highly 
educated women who prefer to first pursue a career, since the latter may not even 
have had their first child (yet) at the time of the survey. In order to gain insight in 
the importance of such selection effects, first- and second-birth rates should be 
modelled simultaneously, with a correlated term included in all equations to 
capture part of the unobserved heterogeneity. Previous studies have shown that a 
modelling strategy of this type may strongly alter the estimated effects of the 
education level; a positive effect may even turn negative (see for example 
Kreyenfeld 2002; Kravdal 2001). We have not followed such a modelling strategy 
here, so the results presented below are selective in the sense that they hold only 
for people who have already had their first child, and who thus by definition form 
a special, more family-oriented group indeed. This does not invalidate or bias our 
results, it only limits their applicability. 
 
 
6  Results 
We start with a simple model (Model  I) that only includes the second-order 
polynomial function of the number of years elapsed since the first birth, the 
calendar year when that first birth occurred (centred around its median value of 
1996), and a random country effect, assumed to be a draw from a normal 
distribution. The parameters of this and all other models are presented in Table 2. 
First note that the fitted linear time trend is negative and statistically 
significant, meaning that second-birth rates were generally going down in Europe. 
We will not discuss this trend any further. The fitted shape of the baseline hazard 
rate is depicted in Figure  2. On average across Europe, the probability that a 
second birth occurred within the same calendar year as the first birth is estimated 
to be around 5%. This conditional probability (given that a first birth has, and that 
a second birth has not yet occurred) then rises to reach a maximum in the fifth 
year after the first birth: if parity progression had not yet occurred by then, the 
probability that it does occur that year is around 23%. For the remaining parents 
with a single child, the hazard rates then goes down again.  
 
Table 2:  
Progression to the second birth: results of multilevel logistic regression for all five models presented in this article 
         Model I    Model II    Model  III    Model IV    Model  V    
         b  s.e.     b  s.e.     b  s.e.     b  s.e.     b  s.e.    
Fixed effects        
 Intercept  -2.999  0.092  ***  -2.955  0.1 ***  -3.036  0.089 ***  -3.077 0.096  *** -3.126  0.16  *** 
  Year of 1
st birth    -0.033  0.003  ***  -0.032  0.004  ***  -0.033 0.004  *** -0.033 0.004 ***  -0.034  0.004 *** 
 Years  since  1
st  birth  0.728 0.021  ***  0.729 0.022  ***  0.739 0.022  ***  0.741 0.022 ***  0.786  0.026 *** 
 Years  since  1
st  birth  squared  -0.073 0.002  ***  -0.073 0.002  *** -0.073 0.002  *** -0.073 0.002 ***  -0.079  0.003 *** 
  Age at 1
st birth (centred)        -0.004  0.005    -0.01 0.011    -0.043 0.014  **  -0.025 0.013  + 
  Age at 1
st birth squared         -0.001  0.001   +  -0.004 0.001  *** -0.004 0.001 ***  -0.005  0.001 *** 
  Level  of  education  (ref.=Low)                         
  -  Middle        -0.08  0.047    +  -0.053 0.061    0.001 0.055    -0.119 0.105   
  -  High        0.071  0.054    0.08  0.078   0.105  0.074   -0.067  0.149  
  Interaction: Age at 1
st birth x Level of education (ref.=Low)                 
    -  High                   0.051  0.013  ***  0.048  0.015  ** 
    -  Middle                 0.044  0.011  ***  0.052  0.013  *** 
  Enrolment in day care for the below  age 3 in  %, ca.2004°                    
  -  High                        0.012  0.005  * 
  -Middle                      0.008  0.004  + 
            St.dev.        St.dev.        St.dev.        St.dev.        St.dev.    
Random effects                          
  Country  (Intercept)   0.394     0.394     0.332     0.367     0.294  
  Age  at  1st  birth              0.048     0.048     0.03  
  Middle level of education               0.184     0.123     0.075  
  High level of education               0.262     0.218     0.241  
Number of cases                          
  Macro-level  (countries)   23     23     23     23     16   
   Micro-level (person years)     33482        33177        33177        33177        23617    
 
Notes: Significance levels (p):  *** <0.001; ** <0.01; * <0.05; + <0.1.  °Country-level variable. All the other variables in models are individual characteristics of women. Jan Van Bavel and Joanna Różańska-Putek   123 
 
Figure 2:  
Fitted shape of the baseline second-birth rate 
 
 
There are significant differences between countries, as illustrated by Figure 3 
and indicated by a likelihood ratio test (comparing the deviance for Model I with 
the one for a model without country effects; chi²=428, df=1, p<0.001). The 
country parameters displayed in Figures  3 to 8 are the Best Linear Unbiased 
Predictors (also called Empirical Bayes Estimates) of the random country effects 
(see Agresti 2002), estimated with R’s lmer function (part of the lme4 package, 
Bates and Sarkar 2007). Second-birth rates are estimated to be low, as expected, 
in southern and eastern European countries—with Portugal exhibiting 
exceptionally low rates, presumably exaggerated due to sampling error. They tend 
to be high in western and northern Europe. 124   Second birth rates across Europe 
Figure 3: 
Best Linear Unbiased Predictors of the random country effects in Model I; effects 
are on the scale of the logit 
 
Note:  Meaning of the country codes: AT Austria, BE Belgium, BG Bulgaria, CH Switzerland, CY Cyprus, DE 
Germany, DK Denmark, EE Estonia, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB Great Britain, HU Hungary, IE 
Ireland, LV Latvia, NL the Netherlands, NO Norwary, PL Poland, PT Portugal, RO Romania, SE Sweden, SI 
Slovenia, SK Slovakia   
 
In order to assess the size of these country effects, the implications of the 
country effects are plotted on a natural scale in Figure 4. In order to construct that 
figure, we calculated the proportions expected to have a second child within five 
years after the birth of the first child (assumed to be born in 1996). The figure 
shows that the heterogeneity in second-birth rates in Europe can be considered 
large: the predicted percentages with a second child within five years range from 
around 40% in the countries from southern and eastern Europe to around 65% in 
northern and western Europe. As can be seen in Figure 5, these differences are 
consistent with the idea that second-birth rates are to a large extent responsible for 












Predicted probability to have a second birth within five years after first childbirth by 




Scatter plot with estimated country effects on conditional second-birth rates (logit 
scale) and total fertility rates for the year 2000 
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Model II just adds fixed effects for the mother’s education level and age at 
first birth in order to see to what extent these country differences can be explained 
by the heterogeneous composition of these countries in terms of these two 
characteristics. Age at first birth is centred around its median value of 25 years 
and is included as a second-order polynomial in order to allow a non-linear effect. 
Education is included with two dummies for a medium and high level of 
education, low education being the reference category. No random slopes are 
estimated yet. Comparing the country effects of Models I and II we learn that the 
differences cannot be explained by differential first birth timing or composition 
by education level. Figure 6 shows that inclusion of these factors hardly changes 




Estimated country effects with and without including education level and age at first 
birth (Model II versus Model I) 
 
 
In Model II, there is not much of an effect, if any at all, of age at first birth on 
second-birth rates, on average across Europe. This may seem surprising given 
earlier findings that a later age at first birth is negatively associated with 
completed fertility and given the results of a simulation exercise suggesting that 
the postponement of first births leads to a rapid decline in second-birth rates 
(Billari and Borgoni 2005). It is less surprising, though, given the empirical 
evidence for a number of countries (including Sweden, France, Denmark and 
Austria) that substantial fertility delays have not actually led to declining second-
birth parity progression rates (Sobotka 2008: 39-40). The education level also has Jan Van Bavel and Joanna Różańska-Putek   127 
 
 
hardly any effect according to Model  II. Presumably, the estimated effects of 
first-birth timing as well as of education in Model II are averaging out effects that 
are likely to be very heterogeneous across Europe. 
Therefore, in Model  III, the effects of age at first birth and the woman’s 
education level are explicitly modelled to vary by country by including random 
slopes. Overall, on average across Europe (not weighted by population size), it 
appears now that there is a negative effect of age at first birth, as indicated by the 
significantly negative effect of the quadratic term. Below, we will explore country 
heterogeneity of the size of this effect on the natural scale of the dependent 
variable. Statistically, the overall effect of the education level across Europe is not 
significantly different from zero. However, there are statistically significant and 
substantially very important differences between European countries (see Figure 
7). 
Figure 7 shows that in countries that have relatively high second-birth rates 
overall, as indicated by their high-value intercept in the bottom left panel of the 
figure, the highly and medium educated tend to have higher second-birth rates 
than the less educated. This is the case, for example, in the Netherlands, Finland, 
Ireland, Sweden, Great Britain and Belgium (see the top right panel of Figure 7). 
In countries that have low second-birth rates overall (on the left hand side of the 
distribution of the bottom left panel of Figure 7), the highly or medium educated 
tend to have lower second-birth rates than the less educated. This is the case in 
Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Poland, for example. In some cases, the 
confidence intervals are quite large but the pattern is clear and consistent. It 
suggests that the behaviour of the well-educated is crucial in making the 
difference between ordinary low and very low fertility.  
In order to assess the different sizes of the effects of age at first birth by 
country, we have calculated, in the same way as above, the predicted proportions 
of having a second birth within five years after the birth of the first child. Since 
the effect of age at first birth not only differs by country but also is non-linear, it 
cannot be summarised in one number per country. Therefore, we calculated the 
predicted proportions with a second birth for three ages at first birth (20, 25 and 
30 years), which can then be compared in order to see how big a difference they 
make for each country. The results are shown in Figure 8. 128   Second birth rates across Europe 
Figure 7: 
Country differences in the effects of education level and age at first birth on the level 




Proportion with a second birth within five years by age at first birth and country 
 Jan Van Bavel and Joanna Różańska-Putek   129 
 
 
First, Figure 8 indicates that expected second-birth rates (cumulated for five 
years) are most often the lowest when the first child is born to a mother who has 
already reached age 30: the red dot is left in line for most countries. Yet, there are 
exceptions (Bulgaria, Romania and Poland) and the size of the age-at-first-birth 
effect differs very much between countries. Second-birth rates are particularly 
lower for women who became a mother at age 30 instead of age 25 in Ireland, 
Denmark, Norway and France. The differences in second-birth rates by these two 
ages at first birth are much smaller in Portugal, Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia, Poland 
and Hungary. Secondly, second-birth rates tend to be highest when the first birth 
occurred at an age that is closest to the historically and culturally expected age at 
(marriage and) first birth. That is: in countries that are close to the Hajnal line, 
where family formation is expected to occur earlier (Hajnal 1965; Watkins 1986), 
second-birth rates tend to be highest when the first child came at age 20. This is 
the case in Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia and Hungary. In contrast, 
second-birth rates tend the be the highest among women who had their first child 
at age 25 rather than at age 20 in countries where the Malthusian marriage pattern 
has been dominating the demographic regime, i.e. farther to the west of the Hajnal 
line. In the following countries, second-birth rates tend to be higher for women 
who had their first child at age 25 instead of at the young age of 20 years: 
Switzerland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, France, Sweden, 
Austria, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, and also Slovenia and Spain (the latter 
two rather pertain to the Mediterranean marriage pattern).  
This suggests that the effects of the timing of the first birth on second-birth 
rates seem to be driven more by cultural forces than by a ‘biological clock’. In 
countries where women are cultural-historically expected to become a mother at a 
young age, second-birth rates tend to be highest when the first child was born at a 
young age. In countries where women are cultural-historically expected to 
become a mother at a more advanced age, second-birth rates are highest when the 
first child came when the woman was indeed around age 25 instead of around age 
20. Whether this interpretation is true or not, postponement effects on second-
birth rates across Europe are clearly not only a matter of declining fecundity with 
age (‘the biological clock’). 
The effect of the timing of the first birth may not only vary by country but 
also by education level. Previous research suggests that more highly educated 
women may be more successful in catching up when a first birth has been 
postponed than the less educated. In order to assess whether there is such a pattern 
overall across Europe, Model  IV includes product terms allowing for an 
interaction between the effect of age at first birth and the education level. The 
results in Table 2 show that there is a significant interaction. Figure 9 illustrates 
the importance and strength of the interaction. 130   Second birth rates across Europe 
Figure 9: 
Predicted proportions having a second birth within five years after the first birth, by 
age at first birth and education level 
 
 
When women have their first birth around the modal age at first birth (age 
25), there are hardly any differences, on average across Europe, between the 
lower, the medium and the more highly educated. Yet, when the first birth occurs 
at a higher age, big differences arise. When the first birth occurs around age 35, 
around 45% of the more highly educated women are expected to have at least a 
second birth five years later. For the less educated, this probability is only around 
25%. The medium educated are in between. So the model results are consistent 
with the idea that, on average across Europe, the more highly educated are 
catching up more than the less educated. At least to some extent, this will result 
from a selection process: the less educated are expected to have their first child at 
a lower age, so the ones who have their first child at advanced ages may be 
experiencing problems of fecundability. 
If a first birth occurred at a particularly young age, say below age 20, then 
second-birth rates are modelled to be higher for the low than for the highly 
educated—who may at the time of their first birth still be enrolled in higher 
education; the education level is measured at the time of the interview and may 
have been attained after the birth of the first child. 
Finally, the question is to what extent these differences between countries and 
between education levels can be explained by the availability and the use of child 
care. Therefore, in a final step, we entered the day care enrolment rates into the 
equation as a country-level covariate. Since this variable is not available for all Jan Van Bavel and Joanna Różańska-Putek   131 
 
 
countries, the number of countries is limited to 16 in this analysis as opposed to 
23 in the previous ones. The results can be seen in Table 2. 
Child care enrolment appears to have a major effect on second-birth rates, but 
not for all women. For women with a low education level, it does not make a 
difference whether formal day care for young children is a widespread practice in 
their country or not. For highly educated women, it does make a big difference, as 
illustrated by Figure 10. Again, the medium educated are in between.  
In order to show how high or low the enrolment rates actually were in these 
16 European countries around 2004, Figure 10 includes ‘country balls’ at the 
bottom. Enrolment rates were lowest in Poland, Hungary, Germany and Austria. 
They were highest in Denmark but also high in Belgium, Sweden and Norway. 
The finding that high child care enrolment is associated with high second-birth 
rates among the more highly educated but not among the less educated is 
consistent with the idea the availability and acceptability of child care helps 
bringing down the opportunity costs of having an additional birth, and that this is 
particularly relevant for the highly educated. 
 
Figure 10: 
Proportion predicted to have a second child within 5 years after the first birth by 
country-level enrolment rate in child care and woman’s education level* 
 
Note:* Predicted proportions for women who had their first child at age 25 in the year 1996. 
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7  Conclusions 
The country gradient of second-birth rates is large in Europe. Estimated 
probabilities to have a second child within five years after the first birth range 
from around 40%, typically in central and eastern Europe but also in Portugal 
(just over 30%) and Spain (about 45%), to around 65% in northern and western 
Europe. The differences are a major driving force behind the gap between very 
low and ordinary low fertility. 
The effect of the timing of the first birth on second-birth rates is non-linear 
and differs by country. The results suggest that second-birth rates are highest 
when the first birth occurred at an age that is culturally considered ‘normal’ or 
‘expected’. That is: close to the Hajnal line, second-birth rates tend to be highest 
when the first birth occurred at a relatively young age (when the woman was 
under age 25). In contrast, farther west of that line they tend to be highest when 
the woman was somewhat older when she became a mother (say between age 25 
and 30). This suggests that socio-cultural expectations about the ‘proper age for 
motherhood’ may be more important in explaining the effects of the first-birth 
postponements than declining fecundity with age (the ‘biological clock’). This 
needs to be investigated in a future study. 
The connection between education level and second-birth rates differs 
strongly by country: in some countries, high education is associated with lower 
second-birth parity progression rates than for the less educated. In other countries, 
high education is associated with higher second-birth rates than for less educated 
women. Note that the presented regression slopes for education should not be 
interpreted as pure causal effects of women’s education level. For example, we 
have not anywhere controlled for the male partners’ education levels, which may 
indeed have a stronger effect on second-birth rates than the female partner’s 
education level (as in Germany and Austria, for example, see Kreyenfeld 2002 
and Prskawetz and Zagaglia 2005, respectively). Since sexual partners tend to 
have similar levels of education, high male education is picked up by high female 
education in our models. 
There are important interaction effects between the timing of the first birth 
and the education level: high age at first birth implies much lower second-birth 
rates for the less educated, while this is much less the case for the highly 
educated. So, our findings are consistent with the idea that the highly educated are 
more successful in catching up for delayed first childbearing than the less 
educated. This will at least to some extent represent a selection effect: the less 
educated are expected to have their first child at an earlier age, and among the 
ones who have their first child at a later age than expected, a relatively high 
proportion may be experiencing fecundity problems, for example.  
The behaviour of the highly educated appears to be crucial for a country’s 
overall fertility level: in countries where highly educated women have higher 
parity progression rates, total fertility tends to be relatively high overall. In Jan Van Bavel and Joanna Różańska-Putek   133 
 
 
countries where the highly educated have lower second-birth rates than the less 
educated, total fertility tends to be very low. It would be interesting to investigate 
in future work whether similar outcomes hold also for the transition to third 
births, which also contribute to fertility differences across Europe. How important 
are the effects of the age at first birth on differences in the transition to third births 
by country and education level? Would more highly educated women still be 
more successful in catching up higher-order births if they postponed their first 
birth? 
High enrolment in child care is strongly associated with high second-birth 
rates, but only for the better educated. There is no effect of child care, on average 
across Europe, on second-birth rates for the less educated. This is consistent with 
the theory that the better educated have more to gain from child care availability 
and acceptability because they have a more elevated earning potential and, hence, 
face higher opportunity costs if taking young children to formal day care facilities 
is not a realistic option. 
This study has some important limitations. First, our measure of enrolment in 
child care is a somewhat crude one. For example, it does not take into account the 
number of hours a child spends in day care per week. We know that there are 
large country differences in this matter which we have not taken into account. 
There is a trade-off to make in any cross-country research: on the one hand, 
ideally, we would want to use more detailed information about child care 
practices, but on the other hand, such data tend to be available only for some 
countries. And even if they are available, they are often incomparable. Therefore, 
we think that we need two kinds of studies. On the one hand, we need in-depth 
studies covering one or only a handful of countries but really addressing the 
issues in detail. On the other hand, we also need studies giving the big picture, 
without getting into the complexities of each single country. This study clearly 
belongs to the second type. 
Another limitation is that we have used enrolment rates for around the year 
2004, while most children studied were born in the years before that. Again, this 
is a data limitation that is not easily overcome. We assume for the time being that 
the rank order of countries has not changed a lot over the past two decades and 
hope that any between-country trends are not big enough to invalidate our results. 
We need more studies about this to be fully confident about this issue. Recent 
child care enrolment rates will probably correlate with other country differences, 
including family policies but also cultural characteristics like attitudes towards 
childrearing. It remains to be seen whether the reported effect of child care 
enrolment will still hold after controlling for such other country characteristics. 
Finally, we have not been able to address the importance of reverse causality, 
i.e. to assess the extent to which child care enrolment rates are influenced by our 
dependent variable, i.e. second-birth rates. Maybe highly educated populations 
who  want more second births have also been putting more pressure on their 
governments to invest in day care facilities. More generally, the regression 134   Second birth rates across Europe 
parameters presented in this paper cannot be interpreted as estimates of a ‘pure’ 
causal effect, as understood in a counterfactual perspective. Many explanatory 
variables in our models can be considered endogenous for many reasons. The 
positive association between child care availability and second-birth rates among 
highly educated women may be caused by their prior preference structure. 
Therefore, we should not conclude that, if high child care availability were to be 
implemented in a country where child care availability actually is low, second-
birth rates would rise consequently. In order to make that happen, at least the 
cultural beliefs about working mothers and the pros and cons of day care have to 
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